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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
All the parties to the proceedings below are listed in the caption.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Ihe Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below

3

C.

Statement of Facts

4

ARGUMENT SUMMARY

7

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I

7

OLSEN CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST PCMC

7

A.

B.

C.

Olsen Cannot Rely On The Testimony Of Dr. Santora
To Establish A Prima Facie Case Of Medical Malpractice
Against PCMC

8

Olsen Cannot Rely On The Testimony Of Dan Offret
To Establish A Prima Facie Case Of Medical Malpractice
Against PCMC

9

Olsen Has Not Produced Any Competent Expert Testimony
Or Evidence To Rebut The Affidavit Of Gary L. Halversen, M.D

i

11

POINT II

12

OLSEN CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
BATTERY AGAINST PCMC
A.

B.

12

Utah Has Never Expressly Recognized A Claim
For Battery Where A Patient Claims To Have
Withdrawn Consent

12

Even If Utah Law Recognizes A Claim For Intentional Battery
Based Upon Withdrawn Consent, Olsen Cannot Establish A
Prima Facie Case Of Intentional Battery In This Matter

13

CONCLUSION

17

u

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993)

7

Englishv. Kienke, 774P.2d 1154 (Utah App. 1989)

2

Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

7

Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957)

7

Jones on Evidence, Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1953)
Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah App. 1992)

9
12, 13

Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959)

7

Mints v. Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477, 138 S.E.2d 902 (1964)

13, 14

Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980)

7

Shepherdv. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429 (Utah App. 1994)
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980)

16
9

Wyclais v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989.)

1, 2

STATUTES
61 Am.Jur.2d § 174 at 305

13

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-20)

1

Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3

1

iii

JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Constitution, Article
VIII, Section 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2Q).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

1 Jul llii1 IIKII ( milt H I III nullum, llial, ,r i in illcr of law pLtintitTfailed to

demonstrate through expert testimony or other evidence presented, that defendant breached the
applicable standai d :>f cai e ai id that the bi eacl i pi oximately caused plaintiffs injury?
S t a n d a r d o f Review: "Appellate courts scrutinize summary judgments under the
same standard applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference t o a trial court's legal
conclusions concerning whether the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal
result obtains." Wyclais v. Guardian

Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 8 2 4 (Utah App. 1989.)

Reference t o Record: Issue number one w a s raised in Defendant's
Memorandum in Support o f Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 66-67.) The issue was also
.mifift'ssed in I he * null \ Kulmj', dafnl brbniiij

, V^Hi and the

in I \ (In In daled Man h I,

1996. (R. 132-133 and 191-194.)
2.

Did th :!: ti ial coui t ei i in i i ilii ig that I Jtah la K does not expi essl> recognize

a battery claim based upon a patient's withdrawal o f consent for medical treatment?
S t a n d a r d of Review: "Appellate courts scrutinize summary judgments under the
same standard applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference t o a trial court's legal

1

conclusions concerning whether the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal
result obtains." Wyclais v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App. 1989.)
Reference to Record: Issue number two was raised in Defendant's Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 68-70.) The issue was also addressed in the
court's Minute Entry dated January 30, 1996, the court's Ruling dated February 7, 1996 and the
court's Order dated March 1, 1996. (R. 127, 132-133 and 191-194.)
3.

Assuming arguendo that Utah law recognizes causes of action based upon

a patient's withdrawal of consent for medical treatment, did the trial court err in ruling that the
evidence presented by plaintiff is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish that defendant's
radiology technician acted with the requisite intent to establish a battery?
Standard of Review: The appellate court examines the lower court's conclusions
of law and reviews them for correctness. English v. Kienke, 11r4 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App.
1989).
Reference to Record: Issue number three was addressed in Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 67-68.) The issue was also
addressed in the court's Minute Entry dated January 30, 1996, the court's Ruling dated February
7, 1996, and the court's Order dated March 1, 1996. (R. 127, 132-133 and 191-194.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case. Plaintiff appeals from summary judgment granted on

all claims made by plaintiff against defendant.
2

B.

The Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. On

November 11, 1993, Travis Olsen ("Olsen") filed a medical malpractice complaint against
defendant Intermountain Health Care doing bi isiness as P1 " * ini [
("PCMC"), alleging negligence and intentional battery. (R. i -'-

,l l|

'ildren's ? fedical Center

On January 10, 1996, PCMC
rind .in .ifliddvil |K Ml fil

and 62-82). PCMC argued that Olsen could not maintain his claim of medical malpractice due to
a lack of expert testimony to establish a standard of care, a breach of the standard and the
causation of damages. PCMC also argued that a claim of battery could not be sustained because
Utah does not expressly recognize a claim for battery based upon withdrawal of consent and
because the facts of this case do not establish a legally sufficient withdrawal of consent. Finally,
PCMC argued that Olsen could not support his claim for punitive damages and that summary
judgment was appropriate on the punitive damages claim ;is n nulla of Liw. (R. 62- 82.)
Olsen filed a memorandum in opposition to PCMC's motion for summary

the affidavit of Gary L. Halversen, M.D. on January 18, 1996. (R. 124-126). Oral argument was
^judgmen

»

strike. After considering the oral arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda, the court
liijiid'il 1*1 Mi

fiH.iimi tin Jiiiinuiiy judgment

.

ittery claim an

punitive damages claim. The court also denied Olsen's motion to strike and took PCMC's
motion for summary judgment with respect to the malpractice/negligence claim under
3

advisement. (R. 127,132-133). After further consideration of the malpractice/negligence claim,
the court granted PCMC's motion for summary judgment in total. (R. 132-133.)
Olsenfiledhis notice of appeal on March 19, 1996. (R. 198-200). Olsenfiledhis
appellate brief on June 3, 1996. Olsen does not challenge the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on the punitive damage claim, nor does Olsen challenge the trial court's denial of
Olsen's motion to strike.
C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

This case is a medical malpractice action in which Olsen contends that

PCMC's radiology technician, Dan Offret ("Offret"), injured Olsen while positioning him for a
post-operative x-ray of the pelvis. (R. 63.)
2.

At the time of Olsen's surgery on March 20, 1991, Olsen had a lengthy

history of suffering from cerebral palsy and related right hip pain. (R. 63.)
3.

On March 20, 1991, Dr. Stephen Santora ("Dr. Santora") performed a

procedure known as a Salter Pelvic Osteotomy, a procedure in which a wedge of bone is inserted
in the pelvis to correct an improper angle of the hip. (R. 63.)
4.

In thefirstsurgery, Dr. Santora used two bone screws to anchor the wedge

of bone to the osteotomy site. (R. 63.)
5.

On March 23, 1991, Olsen underwent a pelvic X-ray that was performed

by PCMC's radiology technician, Offret. (R. 63.)

4

6.

Proper positioning for the x-ray ordered by Dr. Santora would involve

placing the patient on his back on the x-ray table, putting the patient's feet together and
spreading the knees apart approximately fifteen degrees from the mid-line of the boc
7.

^ . 64.)

During positioning for the x-ray, Olsen claims that Offret treated him

rough!

••• •

8.

.

)

Olsen claims that he screamed in pain and told Offret to stop the

procctluir m, l< M )
9.

Olsen claims that he heard and felt a "pop" in the hip area during the x-ray

procedure,,, (R 64.)
I

A post-operative pelvic x-ray of March 23, 1991, revealed that the screws

which had anchored the wedge of bone had pulled out slightly, causing the osteotomy to slip.
(R.64.)
11.

Olsen claims that the rough treatment by Offret caused the osteotomy to

thereby giving rise to •* --reJ

r

-

?K

., .* . on. (R.64.)

Dr. Santora has testified that the osteotomy could have slipped during

transferred to and from bed or elsewhere. (R. 64.)
13.

t

radiologist, establishes that if the osteotomy slipped during positioning for an x-ray, it could
hav e ione so w ithout any negligence on the part of the radiology technician. | R o.S and '7- 78.)
5

14.

Dr. Santora performed a second operation on March 25, 1991 to correct

the slipped osteotomy. (R. 65.)
15.

During the second surgery, Dr. Santora used a plate and three screws to

affix the wedge of bone to the osteotomy site. (R. 65.)
16.

The second surgery was successful and produced a result equal to that

achieved after the first surgery. (R. 65.)
17.

PCMC's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff of April 14, 1994,

requested that Olsen identify all expert witnesses who would testify concerning the standard of
care in this case. (R. 65.)
18.

In answering Interrogatory No. 17 in Olsen's Answers to PCMC's First

Set of Interrogatories of August 18, 1994, Olsen stated:
Plaintiff has not determined whether he will call any expert witness at
trial. If such a determination is made, this Answer will be supplemented.
(R. 65.)
19.

Olsen never supplemented his original Answer and never identified an

expert witness. (R. 65.)
20.

Olsen's Designation of Witnesses of September 19, 1995, failed to

identify any expert who could testify concerning the standard of care for radiology technicians in
this case. (R. 66.)

6

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Olsen cannot establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against PCMC.
Olsen cannot establish & prima facie case of battery against PCMC.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
OLSEN CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST PCMC.
In order to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice, Olsen
"provide expert testimony to establish: (1) The standard of care, Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah
7A\ In W1Y ,M llnfi, I I 10 ( 1 9 5 9 ) ; ( 2 ) defendant'.1. Inilim to <:nmpl\ with tint standard

\iuli>n

v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980); and (3) that defendant caused plaintiffs injuries,
Huggi

6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957)." Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain

Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Further, issues of fact which are outside
knowledge of lay persons must be established by expert testimony." Id. Failure to produce
expert testimony is fatal to a medical malpractice claim. In Nixdorf, the Utah Supreme Court
noted: "Expert testimony is required because the nature of the profession removes the
particularities of the practice from the knowledge and understanding of the average citizen." 612
P.2d at 352. Failure to provide expert testimony is grounds for dismissal on a motion for
summary judgment. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993).

7

With respect to this case, Olsen must demonstrate through expert testimony that
PCMC's radiology technician, Offret, deviated from the standard of care. The expert testimony
must establish that the osteotomy slipped during the X-ray positioning of March 23, 1991, and
that the slip occurred as a result of negligence on the part of Offret. Olsen, however, did not
identify a single expert to support any element, let alone every element, of his medical
malpractice claim against PCMC. The absence of an expert notwithstanding, Olsen claims that
he can establish the standard of care and breach thereof with the testimony of Dr. Santora and
Offret. This approach has, and should, prove fatal to Olsen's medical malpractice action against
PCMC.
A.

Olsen Cannot Rely On The Testimony Of Dr. Santora To Establish A
Prima Facie Case Of Medical Malpractice Against PCMC.

Although Dr. Santora has not been named as an expert in this matter, he was
deposed during the discovery phase of the trial court litigation. Olsen has tried to "bootstrap" his
testimony into the expert support that he is required to present for his malpractice claims against
PCMC. In this regard, Olsen argues that Dr. Santora gave an "opinion" that the injury suffered
by ". . . Olsen 'probably' occurred in x-ray." (Appellant's Brief, p. 17) This mischaracterizes Dr.
Santora's testimony.
Olsen's counsel specifically asked Dr. Santora if he had formed a 50% conclusion
as to where Olsen's osteotomy slip occurred and he said "Yeah . . . I'd probably say x-ray."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12, citing R. 112-14) Dr. Santora also testified that"... I understand that

8

something happened in x-ray, and it certainly could have happened. I'm not downgrading that at
all, but it could have happened somewhere else possibly." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12, citing R.
112-14) Notably, Olsen's counsel did not even ask Dr. Santora the obvious question of whether
he felt, within the parameters of "reasonable medical probability," that the osteotomy slip
occurred during the x-ray positioning process.
In sum, Dr. Santora testified that he could not offer better than even odds that the
osteotomy slip occurred during the x-ray positioning process. Such testimony does not rise
above "guess, speculation, or conjecture" and, as such, it does not satisfy the evidentiary
standard established for experts in medical malpractice cases. (See citation to Jones on
Evidence, Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1953) and State v. Jarrell, 608
P.2d 218 (Utah 1980), Appellant's Brief, p. 16-17) Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Santora
cannot be relied upon by Olsen to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against
PCMC.
B.

Olsen Cannot Rely On The Testimony Of Dan Offret To Establish A
Prima Facie Case Of Medical Malpractice Against PCMC.

Olsen claims that Offret"... established the standard of care and his own failure
to comply with the standard." (Appellant's Brief, p. 17) Olsen elaborates by arguing that "Mr.
Offret's testimony established that the standard of care for radiology technicians required him to
follow the doctor's instructions, and to immediately cease positioning a patient when there are
complaints of pain." (Appellant's Brief, p. 17). This argument is fraught with deficiencies.

9

Contrary to Olseris assertions, Offret did not establish the standard of care
applicable to him and the breach thereof during the course of his deposition. Offret testified that
he received an Associates of Applied Science degree in radiologic technology from Weber State
College. He also testified that he received training in patient contact in communication. In this
regard, Offret testified that when patients complain of pain it is desirable to make them as
comfortable as possible. He also testified that one should not hurt a patient. Finally, he testified
that in some circumstances if a patient complains of pain during the positioning process, the
technician may discontinue the positioning process and return the patient to their room or wait
until the patient is comfortable with the positioning process. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13-14, citing
R. 114-116.)
This testimony does not establish the standard of care applicable to radiology
technicians or a breach thereof under the facts of Olsen's case. Offret's testimony is nothing
more than a statement of very general principles. Offret's testimony is supported by that of Dr.
Santora, in which he states that all patients are in some degree of pain when they are undergoing
post-operative x-ray procedures. He testified:
Q

Would you expect an x-ray technician at Primary Children's Hospital to
stop a procedure if the patient was complaining of pain, of tremendous
pain?

A

I'm not sure if I could speak for them. I'm sure there are times that they
can't do procedures because the patients are uncooperative maybe
secondary to pain, but a lot of the procedures that are done there are done
on children, at least in the orthopedic room, on children with fractures and
broken bones and they are quite painful and most of the time you need to
10

get an x-ray, so I'm sure a lot of the procedures are done under fairly
vocal objections by a lot of the kids up there.
(R. 69-70.) (Emphasis added.)
In sum, Offret's testimony cited by Olsen does not, and cannot, establish a prima
facie case of medical malpractice in this matter.
C.

Olsen Has Not Produced Any Competent Expert Testimony Or
Evidence To Rebut The Affidavit Of Gary L. Halversen, M.D.

The Affidavit of Gary L. Halversen, M.D. was offered in support of PCMC's
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 77-82). This Affidavit establishes that an osteotomy slip
such as that sustained by Olsen could occur during the x-ray positioning process. That Affidavit
also states, however, that even if the osteotomy slip did occur during the x-ray positioning
process, the slipping is not necessarily the result of any negligence on the part of the radiology
technician. This Affidavit establishes that even if one accepts the proposition that Olsen's
osteotomy slip occurred during the x-ray positioning process, the osteotomy slip was not
necessarily the result of any negligence on the part of the radiology technician.
Dr. Halversen's Affidavit was not rebutted by Olsen during the course of the trial
court proceedings. Similarly, his Affidavit was not rebutted in any way by Olsen in his
Appellate Brief. Therefore, Olsen has not produced any qualified expert witness testimony to
define the standard of care applicable to radiology technicians and to testify that there was a
breach of that standard in this matter. To the contrary, however, PCMC has provided competent
expert testimony which demonstrates that even if the osteotomy slip occurred during the x-ray
11

positioning process, such a slip was not necessarily the result of any negligence on the part of the
radiology technician. This evidence in uncontradicted by Olsen. Olsen has failed to establish a
prima facie case of medical malpractice and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of PCMC must be sustained.1

POINT n
OLSEN CANNOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
BATTERY AGAINST PCMC
A.

Utah Has Never Expressly Recognized A Claim For Battery Where A
Patient Claims To Have Withdrawn Consent,

In Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of
Appeals recognized an independent claim against a health care provider based upon the common
law claim of battery. In Lounsbury, the plaintiff claimed he never gave consent to the physician
for a back surgery that the physician performed. The Utah Court of Appeals stated with respect
to the battery claim:
It appears well settled that the battery theory remains applicable where a
medical treatment or procedure is completely unauthorized, whereas the
doctrine of informed consent, grounded in negligence principles, applies
to the much more frequently encountered situation where the treatment or
procedure was authorized, but proper disclosure of the risks inherent and
the treatment was not given.

1

It is also important to note that Olsen has not provided any competent evidence, expert
or otherwise, that the alleged breach of the standard of care by Offret proximately caused the
injuries of which he complains. Thus, Olsen has not satisfied any of the elements of & prima
facie medical malpractice case.
12

Id. at 193-194. The Utah Court of Appeals was not presented with and did not address the
situation in which the patient claims that valid consent was withdrawn during the course of a
procedure. Olsen has no valid legal basis upon which he can assert a claim for intentional
battery in this case.
B.

Even If Utah Law Recognizes A Claim For Intentional Battery Based
Upon Withdrawn Consent, Olsen Cannot Establish A Prima Facie
Case Of Intentional Battery In This Matter.

In jurisdictions which recognize a claim for battery based upon withdrawn
consent, the cause of action is typically described as follows:
After treatment or examination of the patient has begun, the patient's
consent previously given may be withdrawn, subjecting the physician to
liability for assault and battery if the treatment or examination is
continued. However, the withdrawal of consent must be unequivocal,
made while the patient is rational, and it must be medically feasible to
desist without danger to the patient's health.
61 Am.Jur.2d § 174 at 305. Olsen's complaint of pain during the x-ray positioning process do
not constitute unequivocal withdrawal of consent.
A two part test for evaluating claims of assault based upon withdrawn consent
was developed by the court in Mims v. Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477, 138 S.E.2d 902 (1964). In
Mims, the plaintiff complained of extreme pain during the administration of a painful barium
enema. The plaintiff complained of extreme pain and begged the radiology technician and
physician to stop the procedure. The Court of Appeals stated:
To constitute an effective withdrawal of consent as a matter after
treatment or examination is in progress commensurate to subject medical
13

practitioners to liability for assault and battery of treatment or examination
is continued, two distinct things are required:
1)
A patient must act or use language which can be subject to
no other inference and which must be unquestioned responses from a clear
and rational mind. These actions and utterances of the patient must be
such as to leave no room for doubt in the minds of reasonable men that in
view of all of the circumstances consent was actually withdrawn.
2)
When medical treatments or examinations occurring with
the patient's consent are proceeding in a manner requiring bodily contact
by the physician with the patient and consent to the contact is revoked, it
must be medically feasible for the doctor to desist in the treatment or
examination at that point without the cessation being detrimental to the
patient's health or life from a medical viewpoint.
Id. at 907. With respect to whether the Mims plaintiff had unequivocally revoked her consent,
the court stated that mere protestations of pain and discomfort were insufficient to establish
withdrawal of consent.
This testimony merely shows protestations by the plaintiff for pain and
discomfort and disagreement with the defendants in the manner they
administered the barium enema. That is not enough.
Id at 908
In this case, Olsen consented to the osteotomy slip procedure and follow up care
attendant thereto. Although Olsen testified that he was experiencing pain during the x-ray
positioning process and that he communicated this pain to the radiology technician and asked
him to stop, these protestations of pain were nothing more significant than those expressions of
pain he had been making since the conclusion of his first osteotomy surgery.

14

The medical records in this case demonstrate that Olsen was complaining of pain
and discomfort after the first surgery. Dr. Santora's note of March 22, 1991, the day before the
subject x-ray, notes "Complains of pain in the right leg - out of proportion somewhat." When
asked about this point in his deposition, Dr. Santora testified:
Q

What did you mean out of position proportionally?

A

Well it is a very subjective comment really because when you do these
sorts of surgeries you have an idea of how much pain the patient will have
following the surgery, and sometimes we treat kids where you think they
are just having more pain than they should for the type of surgery you get.
It certainly doesn't mean they're not having it. It just means that they may
either have a low pain threshold, something could have happened that
caused them more pain.
The osteotomy could have slipped before, although he was basically bed
rested at that point, and we were just starting to get him up with physical
therapy, so its a little bit of a subjective comment in the notes the thing
that I thought he was hurting a little more than he should have been at that
point after the surgery.

(R. 69-70.) (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Santora also testified:
Q

Would you expect an x-ray technician at Primary Children's Hospital to
stop a procedure if the patient was complaining of pain, of tremendous
pain?

A

I'm not sure if I could speak for them. I'm sure there are times that they
can't do procedures because the patients are uncooperative maybe
secondary to pain, but a lot of the procedures that are done there are done
on children, at least in the orthopedic room, on children with fractures and

15

broken bones and they are quite painful and most of the time you need to
get an x-ray, so I'm sure a lot of the procedures are done under fairly
vocal objections bv a lot of the kids up there.
(R. 69-70.) (Emphasis added.)
In sum, Olsen complained of disproportionate pain even before his x-ray of
March 23, 1991. Dr. Santora testified that x-rays of this nature are frequently done under
circumstances where there are vocal complaints of pain, especially in situations involving child
patients. Oflret simply did not have the type of unequivocal withdrawal of consent that would
put him on notice that continuing with the x-ray positioning would constitute battery. Olsen's
protestations of pain and discomfort are not legally sufficient to establish a claim for battery.
Therefore, Olsen cannot establish a prima facie case of intentional battery even if one exists
under Utah law.
Finally, it must be highlighted that Olsen appears to be challenging the trial
court's factual findings underlying its conclusion that the facts of this matter are insufficient, as a
matter of law, to establish that Offret acted with a requisite intent to establish a battery even if
such a claim is recognized in Utah. (R. 193). To successfully challenge a trial court's factual
findings, a plaintiff "must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876
P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994). Olsen failed to marshall the evidence in support of the trial
court's finding that even if there is a cause of action for battery based upon withdrawal of
16

CONCLUSION
The summary judgment in favor of PCMC should be affirmed.
DATED this 9th day of July, 1996.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

GARY D. STOTT
CURTIS J. DRAKE
BRET M. HANNA
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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